1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 86 HON. DAVID P. YAFFE, JUDGE
4	
5	MARINA STRAND COLONY II,)
6	PETITIONER,)
7	VS.) NO. BS 109420
8	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
9	RESPONDENT.
1.0	
11	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
12	WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2009
13	
14	APPEARANCES:
15	FOR THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: JOSHUA L. ROSEN
1.6	ATTORNEY AT LAW 5905 SHERBOURNE DRIVE
17	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90056 (310) 649-0063
18	ARMBRUSTER & GOLDSMITH
19	BY: R. J. COMER ATTORNEY AT LAW
20	10940 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD SUITE 2100
21	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024
2.2	(310) 209-8800
23	ALSO PRESENT: RICHARD I. FINE
24	IN PROPRIA PERSONA
25	
26	ORIGINAL CYNTHIA S. CRUZ, CSR #9095 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

p.2

	A CANADA
1	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; WED., MARCH 4, 2009; A.M. SESSION
2	DEPARTMENT NO. 86 HON. DAVID P. YAFFE, JUDGE
3	APPEARANCES:
4	(THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WITH THEIR COUNSEL,
5	JOSHUA L. ROSEN AND R. J. COMER, ATTORNEYS AT
6	LAW; RICHARD I. FINE, IN PROPRIA PERSONA.)
7	(CYNTHIA S. CRUZ, C.S.R. 9095, OFFICIAL
8	REPORTER.)
9	(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD IN OPEN
10	COURT:)
11	
12	THE COURT: MARINA STRAND COLONY II AGAINST THE
13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
14	MR. FINE: MORNING, YOUR HONOR. RICHARD FINE.
15	MR. ROSEN: JOSHUA ROSEN.
16	MR. COMER: R. J. COMER FOR DEL REY SHORES. C-O-M-E-
17	R.
18	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THIS IS A PROBATION AND
19	SENTENCING HEARING. WE ALSO HAVE A MOTION BY THE
20	INITIATING PARTY AT THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING HERE FOR
21	ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING. THE
22	COURT HAS ISSUED A TENTATIVE RULING ON THAT.
23	ARE BOTH OF YOU ALL OF YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY
24	TO READ IT?
25	MR. FINE: I HAVE READ IT, YOUR HONOR.
26	MR. COMER: YES.
27	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S FIND OUT FIRST FROM MR.
28	COMER OR MR. ROSEN, DO YOU HAVE ANY ARGUMENT YOU WANT TO

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MAKE WITH RESPECT TO --

MR. ROSEN: WELL, THE STATUTE, UNFORTUNATELY, IS NOT A STATUTE THAT HAS MUCH INTERPRETATION. FROM WHAT I GATHER YOUR HONOR'S RULING TO BE, YOU CAN ONLY GIVE THE FEES ON A COUNT THAT HAD TO DO WITH DISOBEYING AN ORDER.

THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT -- THAT'S THE WAY IT SEEMED TO ME. YOU CAN TRY TO ARGUE ME OUT OF IT IF YOU WANT TO. BUT THAT'S THE WAY IT -- WHAT THE STATUTE SEEMS TO SAY. AND I DON'T KNOW WHY IT SAYS THAT, EITHER, BUT IF -- WHY IT DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN ONE KIND OF CONTEMPT AND ANOTHER, BUT IT CERTAINLY SEEMS TO.

MR. ROSEN: WELL, AND UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO CASE LAW ON THIS STATUTE. BUT I WOULD TAKE THE POSITION, YOUR HONOR, THAT WHAT THE STATUTE -- THE STATUTE SAYS:

> "IN ADDITION, A PERSON WHO IS SUBJECT TO A COURT ORDER AS A PARTY TO THE ACTION, OR ANY ACT OF THIS PERSON WHO'S ADJUDGED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATING A COURT ORDER, MAY BE ORDERED TO PAY THE PARTY INITIATING THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING A REASONABLE," BLAH, BLAH, BLAH, ET CETERA.

I'M NOT -- I'M NOT GOING TO STAND HERE AND ARGUE TO YOU THAT IT'S CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT YOU CAN AWARD IT ON ALL, BUT IT DOES NOT -- IT DOES NOT SAY, EITHER, THAT YOU CAN ONLY AWARD IT ON -- I THINK AN EQUALLY REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE WOULD BE THAT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE ONLY CHARGE THE -- THE ONLY CHARGE WERE THE HOLDING-OUT CHARGE, THAT YOU COULDN'T COURT ORDER IT AT ALL. BUT --

1	THE COURT: SO YOUR ARGUMENT IS, THEN, THAT AS LONG
2	AS THERE IS A CHARGE
3	MR. ROSEN: CORRECT.
4	THE COURT: FOR VIOLATING A COURT ORDER, ALL
5	ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN THE PROCEEDING ARE RECOVERED?
6	MR. ROSEN: THE SECTION DOES NOT SEEM TO THE
7	SECTION SAYS:
8	"MAY BE ORDERED TO PAY TO THE PARTY INITIATING
9	THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING THE REASONABLE
10	ATTORNEY'S FEES."
11	AND THAT DOESN'T REALLY ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF
12	WHETHER THERE ARE MULTIPLE CHARGES IN A CONTEMPT
13	PROCEEDING. WE'RE DEALING WITH A STATUTE THAT'S ONLY BEEN
14	IN EFFECT FOR 13 YEARS AND NEVER HAD ANY CASE DECIDED
15	UNDER IT EXCEPT FOR ONE WHICH HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS
16	ISSUE.
17	THE COURT: WELL, THERE MAY BE ONE, BUT I THINK I
18	THINK THAT'S THE MOST SENSIBLE WAY I CAN READ THE STATUTE,
19	SO I'M GOING TO REJECT THAT INTERPRETATION.
20	ANYTHING ELSE?
21	MR. ROSEN: AS TO IF THAT'S THE INTERPRETATION
22	THAT THE COURT IS GOING TO ADOPT, THE ONLY OTHER THING I
23	WOULD SAY IS THAT I THINK THAT
24	THE COURT: ANY OTHER BASIS UPON WHICH YOU CONTEND I
25	SHOULD ALLOCATE OTHER THAN JUST THAT'S WHAT I WAS GOING TO
26	SAY?
27	MR. ROSEN: YES. I THINK WE SPENT MORE THAN 20

THERE WERE FIVE CHARGES, BUT I THINK WE SPENT MORE THAN 20

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1	PERCENT OF OUR TIME IN THIS PROCEEDING ON THE FAILURE TO
2	ANSWER QUESTIONS.
3	THE COURT: I COULDN'T DISCERN THAT FROM ANY OF THE
4	PAPERS THAT I HAD. DID I MISS SOMETHING?
5	MR. ROSEN: NO, WE DIDN'T WE DIDN'T ARGUE THAT.
6	NO, WE DID NOT ARGUE THAT.
7	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. FINE
8	MR. FINE: WELL
9	THE COURT: ON THE MOTION.
10	MR. FINE: YES. FIRST OF ALL, YOUR HONOR, IT SAYS
11	THAT "THE PERSON HAS TO PAY AS A PARTY." THIS IS AN
12	ANCILLARY PROCEEDING. CONTEMPT IS AN ANCILLARY PROCEEDING
13	TO THE CASE AND I'M NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE. SO UNDER THE
14	STATUTE, I DON'T EVEN QUALIFY AS SOMEONE THAT HAS TO PAY
15	ATTORNEY'S FEES. AS NOT
16	THE COURT: YOU DON'T QUALIFY AS SOMEBODY THAT HAS TO
17	PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING?
18	MR. FINE: BECAUSE THE STATUTE SAYS THAT "A PARTY TO
19	THE PARTY TO THE PROCEEDING, THE CONTEMPT, IS ANCILLARY
20	TO THE CASE." THE PARTIES TO THE CASE ARE MARINA STRAND
21	COLONY II AND THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
22	THE COURT: YOU CONSTRUE A STATUTE THAT IS TALKING
23	ABOUT RECOVERING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN A CONTEMPT PROCEEDING
24	WHEN IT SAYS IN THE PROCEEDING IT'S NOT REFERRING TO THE
2 5	CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.
26	MR. FINE: THAT'S CORRECT BECAUSE THE PARTIES THE

CONTEMPT PROCEEDING IS ANCILLARY TO THE CASE AND THE

CONTEMPT PROCEEDING IS TO ENFORCE AN ORDER THAT WAS ISSUED

IN THE CA	ASE. THE	ORDER THA	THEY'RE	TRYING TO E	ENFORCE,	
WHICH IS	THE ILLE	EAL ORDER	HERE, THE	JANUARY 8 TH	ORDER, IS	,
AN ORDER	THAT YOU	ISSUED IN	THE CASE	ILLEGALLY.		

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I THINK IT'S CLEAR, MR. FINE,
THAT THE STATUTE SAYS AND MEANS THAT SINCE YOU ARE THE
CONTEMNOR IN THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING, YOU'RE THE GUY THAT
PAYS THE ATTORNEY FEES.

MR. FINE: ALL DUE RESPECT, YOUR HONOR, THERE IS NO CASE THAT HOLDS --

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT ELSE?

MR. FINE: THE SECOND THING IS THAT THERE WEREN'T FIVE CHARGES, THERE WERE 16 CHARGES IN THIS CASE. YOU HAPPENED TO HAVE GROUPED THEM INTO FIVE CATEGORIES, BUT THERE WERE 16 CHARGES.

THE COURT: I DIDN'T GROUP THEM. THE COUNSEL FOR THE LINITIATING PARTY GROUPED THEM AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING.

MR. FINE: DOESN'T MATTER. THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HAD 16 CHARGES. ONE CHARGE WAS REFUSING TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS OF COMMISSIONER GROSS. SO WE DON'T HAVE ONE-FIFTH HERE, WE HAVE ONE-SIXTEENTH. SO AT THE OUTSET, WE'RE DEALING, IF YOU'RE EVEN THINKING ABOUT ATTORNEY'S FEES, OF ONE-SIXTEENTH. THAT'S NO. 1. SO WE AREN'T DEALING WITH A FIFTH, WE'RE DEALING WITH A SIXTEENTH.

THE COURT: WHAT'S NO. 2?

MR. FINE: NO. 2, WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE ATTORNEY'S FEES, THERE IS NO IDENTIFICATION OF WHAT WAS DONE WITH RESPECT TO THAT ONE-SIXTEENTH. THEY DON'T BREAK OUT WHAT

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1	THEY DID WITH RESPECT TO THAT ONE CHARGE. THEY DON'T
2	THE COURT: THAT'S WHY THE TENTATIVE RULING SAYS
3	THAT:
4	"THE ONLY BASIS THAT I HAVE TO APPORTION IS WITH
5	RESPECT TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE CHARGES THAT
6	THIS CONSTITUTES."
7	MR. FINE: WELL, YOU CAN'T APPORTION THAT BECAUSE YOU
8	DON'T HAVE A BASIS TO DO IT BECAUSE YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT
9	THEY DID. THEY DON'T TELL YOU, AND IT WAS THEIR BURDEN TO
10	TELL YOU. WHAT BRIEF DID THEY WRITE THAT REFERRED TO THAT
11	ONE CHARGE? WHAT PART OF THE BRIEF DID THEY WRITE THAT
12	REFERRED TO THAT ONE CHARGE? HOW MUCH TIME DID THEY SPEND
13	ON THIS PARTICULAR BRIEF THAT REFERRED TO THAT ONE CHARGE?
14	WHAT PART OF THE ACTUAL CONTEMPT TRIAL WERE THEY INVOLVED
15	IN THAT REFERRED TO THAT ONE CHARGE?
16	NOW, THEY CAN'T COUNT THE TESTIMONY OF MR. ROSEN
17	OR MR. COMER. THEY CAN'T COUNT, BASICALLY, WHAT WAS DONE
18	AS TO ANY OTHER CHARGE. THEY CAN'T COUNT ANYTHING OTHER
19	THAN THOSE FEW MINUTES THAT WERE SPENT WITH RESPECT TO THE
20	ONE CHARGE. THEY DIDN'T MEET THEIR BURDEN. THERE IS
21	NOTHING IN THOSE PAPERS THAT SHOWED YOU WHAT THEY DID. IT
22	WAS THEIR BURDEN TO COME FORWARD AND DO THAT. IT'S NOT UP
23	TO THE COURT TO TRY AND DIVINE OUT OF EITHER WHAT THESE
24	GUYS DID. THEY HAVE TO COME IN AND TELL YOU THAT, BUT
25	THEY DIDN'T.
26	AND YOU, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, TRIED TO DIVINE
27	IT AS TO BE ONE-FIFTH. WELL, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS

BECAUSE YOU HAD TO HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS AS TO WHAT THEY

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1	DID. THEY DIDN'T GIVE YOU A REASONABLE BASIS. YOU CAN'T
2	COME OUT OF EITHER AND SAY THEY DID. AT BEST, YOU TRIED
3	TO MAKE IT ONE-FIFTH. WE KNOW IT'S ONLY ONE-SIXTEENTH.
4	AND EVEN THAT ONE-SIXTEENTH DOESN'T HAVE A REASONABLE
5	BASIS.
6	BOTTOM LINE, YOU CAN'T AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES
7	EVEN ASSUMING I WERE A PARTY.
8	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'M GOING TO STICK WITH THE
9	TENTATIVE AND GRANT THE ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF
10	\$24,135.73.
11	ALL RIGHT. LET'S GO TO THE PROBATION AND
12	SENTENCING HEARING.
13	MR. FINE, HAVE YOU PURGED YOURSELF OF THE
14	CONTEMPT BY ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS PUT TO YOU BY
15	COMMISSIONER WHAT'S HIS NAME?
16	MR. COMER: GROSS, YOUR HONOR.
17	THE COURT: COMMISSIONER GROSS IN THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR
18	PROCEEDING?
19	MR. FINE: NO, YOUR HONOR, AND I WOULD INFORM YOU
20	THAT THERE IS PRESENTLY BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
21	COURT A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH REQUEST
22	FOR A STAY, AND I JUST TALKED TO THE SUPREME COURT THIS
23	MORNING, AND THE CASE NUMBER IS 170933. THE PAPERS HAVE
24	BEEN DELIVERED TO YOUR CLERK THIS MORNING, AND WE'RE
25	WAITING TO HEAR IF THE SUPREME COURT IS GRANTING THE STAY
26	OR NOT. AND THEY ARE PRESENTLY CONSIDERING IT, SO I DON'T
27	THINK THAT IN THAT PARTICULAR POSITION, YOU'RE IN A

WELL, YOU'RE IN A POSITION TO REALLY GO FORWARD AND DO ANY

	TYPE	OF	A	SENTENCING	BECAUSE	THIS	WHOLE	THING	MAY	GET
9	THROM	IN C	נטכ	r .						

IF THE SUPREME COURT DOESN'T DO IT, I'LL MOVE
INTO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WITH A PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE AS THE COURT KNOWS, ALL
YOUR ACTIONS WERE ILLEGAL. THEY AREN'T GOING TO STAND UP,
SO YOU MIGHT AS WELL JUST DISPENSE WITH THIS PART OF THE
ACTION.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHEN A HIGHER COURT IN THIS
STATE WANTS TO STAY THIS COURT FROM DOING SOMETHING, IT
FINDS A WAY TO NOTIFY THE COURT THAT ITS ACTION IS STAYED.
WE HAVE RECEIVED NO SUCH NOTIFICATION FROM EITHER THE
COURT OF APPEAL OR THE SUPREME COURT. SO UNLESS AND UNTIL
WE DO, WE WILL PROCEED WITH THIS PROCEEDING.

DO YOU HAVE ANY INTENTION OF ANSWERING THESE
QUESTIONS THAT YOU WERE ORDERED TO ANSWER BY COMMISSIONER
GROSS?

MR. FINE: YOUR HONOR, I WILL NOT ANSWER THOSE
QUESTIONS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE HAVE FINISHED THE WRITS OF
HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE THOSE ARE MY RIGHTS AND I FIRMLY
BELIEVE THAT THIS ENTIRE PROCEEDING WAS ILLEGAL; THAT YOU
VIOLATED THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS THE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. YOUR ACTIONS WERE
ILLEGAL FROM THE BEGINNING BECAUSE YOU TOOK MONEY FROM THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. YOU THEN DECIDED THINGS IN FAVOR
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND YOU HAVE BEEN GIVEN
IMMUNITY FOR HAVING DONE THOSE ACTS UNDER SENATE BILL SBX
211.

1	WE'RE DEALING IN ENTIRE ACTIONS AND,
2	CONSEQUENTIALLY, I AM EXERCISING MY RIGHTS OF PETITION FOR
3	HABEAS CORPUS. AT SUCH TIMES, THOSE RIGHTS ARE ENTIRELY
4	FINISHED. IF, IN FACT, I LOSE WITH THOSE WRITS, THEN I
5	WOULD ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. BUT IF I WIN IN THOSE WRITS,
6	AND THAT'S WHAT'S REMAINING OF THIS PROCEEDING WHICH I NOW
7	GATHER IS ONLY ONE CONTEMPT CHARGE, WHICH EVIDENTIALLY,
8	YOU HAVE FOUND ME NOT GUILTY NOW OF THE CONTEMPT CHARGE OF
9	PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE SINCE THAT DOESN'T SEEM
10	TO BE IN YOUR RULING ANYMORE.
11	THE COURT: DOESN'T SEEM TO BE IN WHAT RULING?
12	MR. FINE: YOU SAY THERE IS ONLY ONE CONTEMPT CHARGE.
13	THE COURT: ONLY ONE CONTEMPT CHARGE THAT CONSTITUTES
14	THE VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER, MR. FINE.
15	MR. FINE: DEALING WITH TWO CONTEMPT CHARGES OR ONE?
16	THE COURT: TWO.
17	MR. FINE: BACK TO TWO.
18	THE COURT: ONE VIOLATION AFTER COURT ORDER AND THE
19	OTHER WHICH DOES NOT
20	MR. FINE: OKAY. THAT WASN'T CLEAR FROM YOUR
21	TENTATIVE BECAUSE IF PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE
22	WOULD HAVE BEEN A VIOLATION AFTER COURT ORDER
23	THE COURT: ONE
24	MR. FINE: WELL, IF A LICENSE WAS TAKEN AWAY
25	THE COURT: I DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS A COURT ORDER
26	THAT YOU VIOLATED ON THIS
27	MR. FINE: THERE WASN'T. THERE WAS NOT A COURT
28	ORDER. IF YOU WERE TRYING TO SAY THAT I WAS PRACTICING

LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE, YOU WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FOUND THERE
WAS A COURT ORDER THAT HAD TAKEN THAT LICENSE AWAY.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. FINE, I UNDERSTAND YOUR ARGUMENT. WHAT ELSE?

MR. FINE: OKAY. SO BASICALLY, GOING BACK TO WHERE WE ARE AT SUCH TIME AS TO MY RIGHTS OF APPEAL THROUGH A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HADEAS CORPUS ARE EXHAUSTED AND I LOSE, THEN I WOULD ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT THOSE RIGHTS ARE NOT EXHAUSTED, I'M NOT ANSWERING QUESTIONS. SO WE'RE IN AN INTERIM PROCEDURE HERE, YOUR HONOR, AND IF YOU WANT TO TRY AND THROW ME IN JAIL DURING INTERIM PROCEDURE, YOU MAY BE DOING ANOTHER ILLEGAL ACT. YOU KNOW THAT IS YOUR POSITION. YOU'VE ALREADY DONE ILLEGAL ACTS. IF YOU WANT TO CONTINUE DOWN THAT ROAD, THAT IS A POSITION THAT OBVIOUSLY YOU HAVE TAKEN BEFORE AND MAY WISH TO CONTINUE TAKING, BUT HIGHER COURTS MAY COME DOWN ON YOU.

JUDGMENT THAT WAS SUDMITTED BY MR. ROSEN AND MR. COMER AND I'VE MODIFIED IT. SOME PARTS OF IT BY INTERLINEATION AND OTHER PARTS BY SUBSTITUTING PAGES FOR THOSE THAT WERE IN THE PROPOSED ORDER. I HAVE INSTRUCTED THE CLERK TO MAKE COPIES OF THE ORDER THAT — AS I HAVE MODIFIED IT TO BOTH OF YOU. SO SHE WILL DO THAT AT THIS TIME. YOU CAN FOLLOW ALONG AS WE GO THROUGH IT.

MR. ROSEN: WE DON'T HAVE TO INTERLINEATE OUR COPY?
THE COURT: NO.

ALL RIGHT. THE FIRST CHANGE IS ON PAGE 6, WHICH

1	AS YOU CAN SEE, I HAVE ADDED A FINDING THAT IS FINDING 9A:
2	"ON MARCH 25TH, 2008, FINE FILED A NOTICE OF
3	DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE YAFFE FOR CAUSE. AND
4	ON MARCH 27 TH , 2008, JUDGE YAFFE STRUCK THE
5	NOTICE OF DISQUALIFICATION."
6	FINDING NO. 10 I HAVE MODIFIED BY STRIKING THE
7	WORDS, "MAKE AN APPEARANCE ON," AND SUBSTITUTED THE WORDS,
8	"PROCEED WITH," SO THAT IT NOW READS:
9	"ON APRIL 10TH, 2008, A HEARING WAS HELD ON BOTH
10	OF FINE'S MOTIONS. FINE REFUSED TO PROCEED WITH
11	THE MOTIONS, ASSERTING THAT THE COURT HAD BEEN
12	DISQUALIFIED AND COULD NOT HEAR THE MOTIONS.
13	THE COURT TOOK THE MOTIONS OFF CALENDAR."
14	I HAVE INTERLINEATED A FINDING 10A WHICH STATES
15	THAT:
16	"ON APRIL 11TH, 2008, FINE FILED ANOTHER NOTICE
17	OF DISQUALIFICATION, BUT A COPY WAS NOT SERVED
18	ON JUDGE YAFFE."
19	AND I HAVE ADDED WELL, I HAVE CHANGED FINDING
20	11 TO READ:
21	"ON APRIL 15TH, 2008, THIS COURT SIGNED AN ORDER
22	AWARDING REAL PARTIES \$46,329.01 IN COMPENSATORY
23	ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (THE 'APRIL 15 ORDER').
24	THE ORDER HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO JUDGE YAFFE BY
25	COUNSEL FOR THE INITIATING PARTY ON APRIL 11TH,
26	2008, WITH A PROOF OF SERVICE SHOWING THAT A
27	COPY HAD BEEN SERVED UPON FINE."
28	THE NEXT CHANGE IS ON PAGE 11 AT LINES 19, 23

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]	The state of the s
1	AND 26 AND 27 IN WHICH I HAVE STRUCK THE FINDING THAT:
2	"THE COURT FINDS FINE GUILTY OF CONTEMPT CHARGE
3	1 BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT BASED ON THE WILLFUL
4	DISOBEDIENCE OF THE COURT'S APRIL 15TH ORDER."
5	I HAVE DONE THAT BECAUSE I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT
6	MR. FINE CAN BE PUNISHED FOR CONTEMPT FOR THE FAILURE TO
7	PAY SANCTIONS.
8	THE NEXT CHANGE IS ON PAGE 12, LINE 26, WHERE
9	I'VE CHANGED "IS" TO "WAS." SO IT STATES:
10	"THIS MATTER WAS CONTINUED TO MARCH 4TH, 2008, AT
11	9:30 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 86 OF THIS COURT FOR
12	SENTENCING."
13	ALL RIGHT. THE OTHER CHANGES ARE CONTAINED ON
14	PAGES 13 AND 14 WHICH I HAVE SUBSTITUTED FOR REMAINING
15	PAGES IN THE PROPOSED ORDER. PARAGRAPH 1 ON FAGE 13
16	STATES:
17	"THE COURT HAS CONSIDERED AND REJECTS FINE'S
18	EXPLANATION THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO REFUSE TO
19	COMPLY WITH THE ORDER BY COMMISSIONER GROSS THAT
20	HE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM IN THE
21	JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S EXAMINATION BECAUSE
22	COMMISSIONER GROSS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
23	MAKE THAT ORDER AS HE WAS NOT, QUOTE, 'A REFEREE
24	APPOINTED BY THE COURT, WITHIN THE MEANING OF
25	SECTION 708.140(A) OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
26	PROCEDURE. THIS CONTENTION HAS NO MERIT FOR THE
27	FOLLOWING REASONS: JUDGMENT DEBTOR PROCEEDINGS

IN CASES PENDING IN THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF THIS

1	COURT ARE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 1A OF THE
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT BY LOCAL RULE 2.5(D), AS IN
3	'DOG.' IN JANUARY OF 2008, COMMISSIONER GROSS
4	WAS ASSIGNED TO PRESIDE IN DEPARTMENT 1A FOR THE
5	CALENDAR YEAR 2008. THE FACT THAT COMMISSIONER
6	GROSS IS ALSO A COMMISSIONER OF THIS COURT DOES
7	NOT DISQUALIFY HIM FROM BEING THE, QUOTE,
8	'REFEREE,' END QUOTE, REFERRED TO IN CODE OF
9	CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 708.140(A). THAT
10	STATUTE EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZES THE REFEREE TO
11	ORDER WITNESSES TO ATTEND AND TESTIFY AT A
12	JUDGMENT DEBTOR PROCEEDING, BUT ONLY THE COURT
13	MAY PUNISH SUCH A WITNESS FOR DISOBEYING THE
14	ORDER OF THE REFEREE."
15	PARAGRAPH 2 STATES:
16	"THE COURT HAS ALSO CONSIDERED AND REJECTED MR.
17	FINE'S CONTENTION THAT HE CAN DISQUALIFY JUDGE
18	YAFFE FROM HEARING A CONTEMPT PROCEEDING AGAINST
19	HIM AND FROM PUNISHING HIM FOR CONTEMPT BECAUSE
20	PART OF JUDGE YAFFE'S REMUNERATION AS JUDGE IS
21	PAID BY THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. THE
22	CONTENTION HAS NO MERIT BECAUSE MR. FINE DID NOT
23	PRESENT A STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION ON THAT
24	GROUND AT THE EARLIEST, PRACTICABLE OPPORTUNITY
25	AFTER DISCOVERY OF FACTS CONSTITUTING THE GROUND
26	FOR DISQUALIFICATION AS REQUIRED BY CODE OF
27	CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 170.3(C)(1). MR. FINE
28	KNEW THAT ALL THE JUDGES OF THIS COURT RECEIVED

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1	COMPENSATION FROM THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ON
2	JUNE 14 TH , 2007, WHEN HE FILED THE UNDERLYING
3	CASE, BS 109420, ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
4	MARINA STRAND COLONY II HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION.
5	HE DID NOT URGE THE GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
6	UNTIL 10 MONTHS LATER AFTER JUDGE YAFFE HAD
7	ORDERED HIM TO PAY SANCTIONS UNDER THE MANDATORY
8	PROVISIONS OF SECTION 473(B) OF THE CODE OF
9	CIVIL PROCEDURE."
10	PARAGRAPH 3:
11	"THE COURT FINDS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
12	(A) MR. FINE IS GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT IN
13	VIOLATION OF SECTION 1209(A) (5) OF THE CODE OF
14	CIVIL PROCEDURE; (B) MR. FINE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF
15	THE ORDERS ISSUED BY COMMISSIONER GROSS AT THE
16	JUDGMENT DEBTOR HEARING; (C) MR. FINE WAS ABLE
17	TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDERS MADE BY COMMISSIONER
18	GROSS AT THE TIME THEY WERE MADE; (D) MR. FINE
19	CONTINUES TO HAVE SUCH ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH
20	SAID ORDERS. (E) MR. FINE HAS WILLFULLY REFUSED
21	TO COMPLY WITH SAID ORDERS; AND (F) MR. FINE
22	CONTINUES TO WILLFULLY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH SAID
23	ORDERS."
24	PARAGRAPH 4:
25	"PURSUANT TO SECTION 1219(A) OF THE CODE OF
26	CIVIL PROCEDURE, MR. FINE IS SENTENCED TO
27	CONFINEMENT IN THE COUNTY JAIL UNTIL HE PROVIDES
28	ALL OF THE INFORMATION THAT HE HAS BEEN ORDERED

1	TO PROVIDE OR IS HEREAFTER ORDERED TO PROVIDE BY
2	THE COMMISSIONER THAT IS ASSIGNED BY THE
3	PRESIDING JUDGE TO PRESIDE OVER DEPARTMENT 1A OF
4	THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF THIS COURT."
5	PARAGRAPH 5:
6	"THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH MR. FINE MAY END HIS
7	CONFINEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: (1) MR. FINE MAY, AT
8	ANY TIME, FILE IN THIS DEPARTMENT A DECLARATION
9	UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY STATING THAT HE IS
10	WILLING TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM IN
11	THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR PROCEEDING WHICH HE HAS BEEN
12	ORDERED, OR IS ORDERED, TO ANSWER BY THE
13	COMMISSIONER ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 1A OF THIS
14	COURT; (2) UPON RECEIPT OF SAID DECLARATION,
15	THIS COURT WILL SET A DATE AND TIME FOR THE
16	RESUMPTION OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR PROCEEDING,
17	NOTIFY OPPOSING COUNSEL THEREOF, AND AUTHORIZE
18	THE SHERIFF TO TRANSPORT MR. FINE TO SAID
19	PROCEEDING; (3) IF MR. FINE DOES NOT REFUSE TO
20	ANSWER ANY QUESTION AFTER BEING ORDERED TO DO SO
21	BY THE COMMISSIONER ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT 1A,
22	THIS COURT WILL AUTHORIZE THE SHERIFF TO RELEASE
23	MR. FINE FROM CUSTODY."
24	PARAGRAPH 6:
25	"INITIATING PARTY SHALL RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES
26	IN THE AMOUNT OF" AND IN THE BLANK SPACE
27	PROVIDED THERE, THE COURT WILL INSERT THE SUM OF
28	\$24,135.73 "AS AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 1218(A)

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IN	THE	JUI	GM	EN'	r."									

PARAGRAPH 7:

"PURSUANT TO SECTION 6127 OF THE BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE, MR. FINE IS SENTENCED TO PAY A FINE OF \$1,000.00 OR TO SPEND FIVE DAYS IN THE COUNTY JAIL FOR ADVERTISING OR HOLDING HIMSELF OUT AS PRACTICING OR AS ENTITLED TO PRACTICE LAW, AND FOR PRACTICING LAW IN THIS COURT WITHOUT BEING AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR. THE FIVE DAYS TO BE SPENT IN THE COUNTY JAIL IS TO BE CONSECUTIVE WITH THE TIME SPENT IN SAID JAIL ON THE PREVIOUS CHARGE."

ALL RIGHT. MR. FINE, I WILL GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE CHANGES REFORE I IMPOSE SENTENCE.

MR. FINE: FIRST OF ALL, YOUR HONOR, AS YOUR HONOR IS AWARE, GIVEN SENATE BILL SBX 211, THE PAYMENTS THAT YOU RECEIVED ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND, CONSEQUENTLY, YOU WILL BE GIVEN IMMUNITY FOR RECEIVING THOSE PAYMENTS AND ANY ACTION YOU HAVE DONE RECEIVING THOSE PAYMENTS. THEREFORE, THE ACTION THAT YOU'VE TAKEN IN THIS CONTEMPT PROCEEDING IS ILLEGAL.

THE REASONS THAT YOU'RE SAYING AS NOT HAVING BROUGHT UP THE DISQUALIFICATION OF YOU IN THE UNDERLYING CASE ARE, THEREFORE, INVALID BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT, GIVEN THE BILL AND THE DISQUALIFICATION AND THE IMMUNITY

THAT	YOU'	RE C	SIVEN	AND	THE	FACT	OF	THE	STU	RGEON	CASI	c, v	WHICH
SAYS	THE	PAYN	ænts	ARE	UNC	ONSTI	TUT	IONA	I, I	WAS	NOT (INDI	ER
ANY	OBLI	SATIO	OT MC	BRI	NG UI	? THE	E DI	SQUA	LIFI	CATIO	NO N	BÉI	IALF
OF M	Y CL	CENT	WITH	RESI	PECT	TO 1	TOU	IF T	HE C	LIENT	DID	4, T	WANT
TO R	AVE :	CHIS	DONE:	a.									

EARLIER DISQUALIFICATION OF YOU IN THE UNDERLYING CASE
REALLY DOESN'T HAVE ANY RELEVANCE. WE ARE NOW IN THE
SITUATION OF YOU'RE ORDERING SANCTIONS AGAINST ME
PERSONALLY AND THE PAYMENTS OF MONEY BY ME PERSONALLY TO
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, AN ORDER WHICH YOU ISSUED
WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN AND
OF ITSELF. THAT ORDER IS ILLEGAL AND INVALID AND AN ORDER
FOR WHICH THE STATE LEGISLATURE HAS FOUND THAT YOU DID AN
ILLEGAL ACT.

SO IN DEALING IN THAT PART OF IT WHERE YOU'RE NOW SAYING THAT I SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED YOU IN THE UNDERLYING CASE, THAT REASONING DOESN'T HOLD WATER. SO CONSEQUENTLY, ON THIS PART OF YOUR JUDGMENT, YOU'RE ENTIRELY WRONG AND THAT PART, NEEDLESS TO SAY, WOULD GET OVERTURNED.

WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF YOU NOT BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE APRIL 11TH DISQUALIFICATION, UNLESS I'M MISTAKEN, I BELIEVE, AND I THINK WE CAN PULL IT, THAT THE APRIL 11TH DISQUALIFICATION SHOWS THAT YOUR HONOR HAD PROOF OF SERVICE. I MAY BE WRONG ON THIS, BUT I'M PRETTY SURE THAT IT DOES, IN FACT -- IT WAS FILED IN THIS COURT, SO YOU KNEW ABOUT IT. YOU KNEW THAT YOU WERE

DISQUALIFIED, AND THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, EVEN IF YOU
HADN'T BEEN SERVED WITH IT, YOU WERE DISQUALIFIED UNDER
SECTION 170.3(C)(4), BY LAW, BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT YOU
DID NOT RESPOND TO THE MARCH 25TH C.C.P. 170.3 OBJECTION
THAT WAS PERSONALLY SERVED UPON YOU.

SO CONSEQUENTLY, YOU ARE OUT. THERE IS NOTHING THAT YOU CAN REALLY DO ABOUT IT. SO YOU DIDN'T HAVE ANY JURISDICTION TO GO FORWARD AND MAKE ANY TYPE OF ORDERS.

NOW, GRANTED, YOU HAVE NOW SHOWN IN HERE THAT

THE APRIL 15TH ORDER THAT IS THE ORDER THAT ACTUALLY MADE

AN ORDER OF \$46,000.00 TO BE PAID TO REAL PARTY IN

INTEREST, WHICH IS THE PARTY THAT MR. COMER AND MR. ROSEN
REPRESENT, THAT ORDER YOU ARE NOT RELYING UPON HERE. SO

REALLY, WHAT WE HAVE IN THIS CASE IS WE HAVE AN ORDER OF
JANUARY 8TH IS THE ONLY ORDER THAT IS EXISTING THAT SAYS

THAT I SHOULD PAY ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THAT ORDER DOES

HAVE AN AMOUNT IN IT.

WHERE YOU ARE HOLDING ME IN CONTEMPT FOR AN ORDER THAT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ALSO INVALID AND ALSO WHICH THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND THE GOVERNOR SAY IS ILLEGAL TO PAY MONEY OF A NON-EXISTENT SUM TO PEOPLE WHERE YOU ARE NOW SAYING I AM IN CONTEMPT BASED UPON AN ORDER OF A COMMISSIONER WHO HAS NOT BEEN APPOINTED AS A REFEREE BECAUSE -- JUST BECAUSE SOMEONE IS ASSIGNED TO A DEPARTMENT, BECAUSE A COMMISSIONER IS ASSIGNED TO A DEPARTMENT, DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE HAS THE ABILITY TO PRESIDE IN THE DEPARTMENT BECAUSE BEING ASSIGNED TO A DEPARTMENT DOESN'T MEAN HE'S

SITTING THERE.

IN ORDER TO PRESIDE IN THE DEPARTMENT, HE'S
EITHER GOING TO BE A TEMPORARY JUDGE OR HE HAS TO HAVE THE
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES, LITIGANTS, UNDER SECTION -ARTICLE 6, SECTION 21 OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, OR
C.C.P. SECTION 259(D), WHICH COMMISSIONER GROSS DID NOT
HAVE OR HE HAS TO RECEIVE AN APPOINTMENT AS A REFEREE.
AND YOU DO NOT EVEN SHOW THAT HE HAD RECEIVED ANY
APPOINTMENT AS A REFEREE. YOU DON'T EVEN REFER TO THAT IN
HERE. YOU JUST SAY HE'S APPOINTED TO PRESIDE IN THE
DEPARTMENT. THAT DOES NOT MAKE HIM A REFEREE.

AND THERE ARE SPECIFIC SECTIONS. IN ORDER TO BE A REFEREE YOU HAVE TO BE APPOINTED AS A REFEREE. THERE IS NO ORDER IN THIS CASE WHICH SHOWS THAT COMMISSIONER GROSS WAS APPOINTED AS A REFEREE. AND IN FACT, WHEN WE DEALT WITH THE OBJECTIONS AND SO FORTH -- AND, IN FACT, THE MOTION TO QUASH THE SUBPOENA, MOTION TO QUASH THE WRIT, COMMISSIONER GROSS DIDN'T EVEN HANDLE THAT. HE SENT IT OUT.

USING YOUR THEORY, IF HE WERE, IN FACT, THE
REFEREE IN THE CASE, HE WOULD HAVE HAD THE ABILITY TO DEAL
WITH THAT PARTICULAR ISSUE BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE THE
ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTIONS. HE WOULD HAVE THE
ABILITY TO DEAL WITH WHETHER, IN FACT, THE WRIT WAS
PROPERLY ISSUED. BUT HE DIDN'T. HE SENT IT OUT. SO
CONSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE A SITUATION THAT WE HAVE A PERSON
THAT IS A COMMISSIONER WHO IS NOT A REFEREE AND WHOM YOU
EVEN ADMIT THERE IS NO SPECIFIC ORDER MAKING HIM A

1	REFEREE.	so	YOU' RE	WRONG	THROUGHOUT	THIS	JUDGMENT.	IT	IS
2	HIGHLY FA	LLA	cious.						

NOW, WE GET TO THE OTHER PART OF THE JUDGMENT WHICH IS DEALING WITH THE FACTS OF PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE OR HOLDING HIMSELF OUT AS PRACTICING LAW, OR ENTITLED TO PRACTICE LAW. THERE IS NO ORDER IN THIS PARTICULAR TRIAL WHICH SAYS THAT I WAS ORDERED INACTIVE. THERE IS NO ORDER THAT SAYS THAT MY LICENSE WAS TAKEN AWAY. THAT'S NOT EVEN EXISTING. AND IN FACT, YOU DON'T EVEN REFER IN THIS JUDGMENT TO ANY EVIDENCE THAT SAYS THAT.

AND IF, HYPOTHETICALLY, THERE HAD BEEN SUCH AN ORDER ENTERED, THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN INVALID BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE UNDERLYING STATE BAR PROCEEDING WAS INVOLVING THE ISSUE OF MY HAVING BROUGHT THE LACAYOS (PHONETIC) CASE AND THE SILVA VERSUS THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CASE, WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE L.A. COUNTY PAYMENTS TO JUDGES WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6, SECTION 18, OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OF ARTICLE 1 AND ARTICLE 14.

NOW, AS WE KNOW, THE STURGEON CASE HELD THAT
THOSE PAYMENTS WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE 6,
SECTION 19, OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION. SENATE BILL
SBX 211 AFFIRMED THE STURGEON CASE AND GAVE THE
GOVERNMENTS, THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS, THE GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES AND EVERYONE IMMUNITY FOR ACTIONS RELATING TO
THOSE GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS. THE STATE BAR, WHO IS THE

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AUTHORIZED ADMINISTRATIVE ARM OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT BEING A GOVERNMENT ENTITY,
ENDS UP PROSECUTING ME FOR HAVING FILED THOSE CASES
CLAIMING THAT THE FILING OF THOSE CASES WAS FRIVOLOUS AND,
THEREFORE, IT WAS MORAL TURPITUDE. THEY GOT IMMUNITY FOR
THAT ILLEGAL ACT.

WHAT I DID IS I APPEALED THE HEARING JUDGE'S STATEMENT OR CONCLUSION THAT THOSE WERE FRIVOLOUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF DISEARMENT AND AN ORDER BEING INACTIVE THAT WENT TO THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DID NOT ORDER ME TO BE INACTIVE AND ONLY DENIED THE PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER B&P CODE 6084(A). THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAS TO ENTER AN ORDER, AND ON THE CASE OF IN RE ROSE, IT SPECIFICALLY SAYS THAT WHEN ONE MAKES A TIMELY PETITION FOR REVIEW, THE COURT MUST ENTER THE ORDER. THEY MUST INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THE SITUATION. SO THERE IS NO ORDER BY THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT.

BUT IT GOES EVEN FURTHER BECAUSE THREE MEMBERS
OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT RECEIVED IMMUNITY BY
HAVING BEEN JUDGES THAT RECEIVED PAYMENTS FROM THEIR
COUNTIES, AND THESE JUDGES WERE CHIN, CORRIGAN AND MORENO.
SO THEY WERE EVEN OUT FROM EVEN BEING ABLE TO DECIDE THAT
ISSUE.

AND IN ADDITION TO THAT, YOU HAVE THE CHIEF

JUSTICE GEORGE AND JUSTICE BAXTER WHO ARE THE JUDICIAL

COUNCIL WHO ARE THE GROUP THAT WROTE SENATE BILL SBX 211,

SO THEY'RE OUT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THEY WERE

PREJUDICED BECAUSE OF THE FACT THEY WROTE THE BILL THAT

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GAVE THE COMMUNITY TO THE JUDGES. SO EVEN IF THERE HAD BEEN SOME TYPE OF A DECISION, THE SUPREME COURT WAS OUT ON SO BASICALLY, WHAT YOU HAVE, IF THEY EVEN HAD PUT IN THE ORDER, THE ORDER DIDN'T WORK, (A).

THE COURT: IS THERE ANY JUDGE OR JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA THAT CAN ORDER YOU TO DO ANYTHING?

MR. FINE: YES, THERE IS, AND BASICALLY, THOSE ARE THE JUDGES THAT (1) ARE IN SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY WHO DID NOT RECEIVE THE PAYMENTS. THE JUDGES IN YOLO COUNTY WHO DID NOT RECEIVE THE PAYMENTS. THE JUDGES IN MENDOCINO COUNTY WHO DID NOT RECEIVE THE PAYMENTS. THE JUSTICES ON THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL WHO DID NOT RECEIVE THE PAYMENTS. THE JUSTICES ON THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL WHO DID NOT RECEIVE THE PAYMENTS. AND TWO JUDGES ON THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, JUDGE WORDAGER (PHONETIC), AND JUDGE KANARD (PHONETIC), HAVING BEEN IN THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT IN 1988 AND EVEN THOUGHT THE PAYMENTS STARTED IN 1988, SHE, I BELIEVE, LEFT THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT IN AUGUST OF 1988 AND, THEREFORE, MAY HAVE BEEN OFF THE COURT BEFORE THE PAYMENTS BEGAN.

SO THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS YES, THERE ARE JUDGES WITHIN THE COUNTY -- CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM THAT CAN ORDER ME TO DO SOMETHING. YOU ARE NOT ONE OF THEM. AND APPROXIMATELY 1,600 OF THESE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES ARE NOT ONE OF THEM. AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF COURT OF APPEAL JUSTICES ARE NOT PART OF THEM. AND A MINIMAL THREE TO FIVE JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ARE NOT ONE OF THEM.

YES, THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL
SYSTEM WHO ARE CLEAN. THERE ARE A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO ARE
NOT CLEAN, AND THOSE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CANNOT ORDER ME TO
DO SOMETHING WITH RESPECT TO THIS PARTICULAR CASE AND WHO
CANNOT ORDER PROPLE TO DO THINGS INVOLVING PAYMENTS FROM
COUNTIES. UNFORTUNATELY, YOUR HONOR, YOU ARE IN THIS
GROUP THAT IS DISQUALIFIED. NOW BY ME AND NOT BY MY
OPINION, BUT BY THE OPINION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA WHO
HAVE PASSED THE LAW THAT HAVE GIVEN YOU IMMUNITY FOR YOUR
ILLEGAL ACTS.

SO ESSENTIALLY, THE JUDGMENT THAT YOU HAVE
TENDERED IS BASICALLY VOID BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT YOU DO
NOT HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO GO OUT AND ENTER THIS
JUDGMENT. YOU DIDN'T HAVE JURISDICTION TO SIT ON THIS
CASE, AND NO MATTER HOW MUCH YOU WANT TO TRY AND GET
AROUND THAT AND NO MATTER HOW MUCH YOU WANT TO DANCE
AROUND IT, LEGALLY SPEAKING, AND NO MATTER HOW MUCH YOU
WANT TO AVOID AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA AND SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, YOU CANNOT DO IT.

WE ARE NO LONGER DEALING IN YOUR INTERPRETATION
OF LAW VERSUS MY INTERPRETATION OF LAW. WE ARE NOW
DEALING WITH THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA WHICH SAID
THAT THE ACTS THAT YOU HAVE DONE ARE ILLEGAL. THEY GAVE
YOU THE IMMUNITY FOR IT. YOU CANNOT BE PROSECUTED
CRIMINALLY IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR YOUR ACTS. YOU
ARE NOT -- YOU CANNOT BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE IN THE STATE

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OF	CALIFORNIA	FOR	YOUR ACT:	S. YOU	CANNO	BE	PUNISHE	D BY
THE	COMMISSION	ON	JUDICIAL	PERFORM	MANCE]	N TI	HE STATE	OF
CAT	TFORNIA FOR	YOU	TR ACTS					

ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, IT'S A DIFFERENT STORY. THERE, UNDER 18 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1346, YOU CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE VIOLATIONS OF THE IMPLIED OR INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO PERFORM HONEST SERVICES. YOU ARE STILL SUBJECT TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND YOU ARE STILL SUBJECT TO FEDERAL LIABILITY. SO THAT IS WHERE WE ARE SITTING.

NOW, YOU MAY TAKE YOUR POSITION, WHICH YOU OBVIOUSLY HAVE, AGAINST THE FEDERAL LAW. YOU MAY TAKE YOUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS THAT YOU HAVE JURISDICTION TO DO SOMETHING. I HAVE MY POSITION, WHICH IS TAKING YOU UP THROUGH THE COURTS AND GOING INTO THE WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY DECIDE THESE PARTICULAR ISSUES. YOU HAVE DONE YOUR THING HERE AND I AM RESPECTFULLY ADVISING YOU THAT IT'S VOID; THAT IT IS ILLEGAL AND IT'S AN ILLEGAL JUDGMENT.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, MR. FINE.

MR. FINE: AND THAT IS WHERE WE ARE SITTING. I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST TO YOU THAT IF YOU'RE THINKING OF ANY TYPE OF IMPOSING OF A SENTENCE AND -- WHICH YOU ARE INDICATING IN HERE, I SUGGEST THAT YOU MAY WANT TO DELAY THE ACTUAL SERVING OF THAT SENTENCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE END UP FINISHING OFF ALL THE WRITS BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT WHAT DOES HAPPEN IS THAT EVEN THOUGH YOU MAY HAVE IMMUNITIES UNDER STATE LAWS, YOU DON'T HAVE IMMUNITIES

1	UNDER FEDERAL LAWS FOR ANY TYPE OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT OR
2	ANYTHING ELSE ON THIS PARTICULAR ORDER. SO WE'RE BOTH
3	DEALING IN RISK HERE.
4	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, MR. FINE.
s	ANYTHING, COUNSEL?
6	MR. COMER: YES, THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
7	MOST OF THE ARGUMENTS YOU HEARD BEFORE AND I
8	DON'T NEED TO RESPOND TO THOSE. WE WOULD ASK THE COURT TO
9	ENACT SENTENCING TODAY, AND ON ONE AMENDMENT TO THE RULING
1.0	IS PARAGRAPH 7 OF PAGE 14. WE RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THE
11	COURT TO AMEND THAT SENTENCING TODAY AND OPDER MR. FINE TO
12	TAKE DOWN THE WEBSITE WWW.RICHARDFINELAW.COM, WHICH IS
13	STILL UP TO DATE.
14	MR. FINE: WELL, YOUR HONOR, IN RESPONSE TO THAT,
15	YOUR HONOR, THE STATE BAR'S, QUOTE, "DISBARMENT ORDER,"
16	HAS NOT GONE INTO EFFECT. SO CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO
17	DISBARMENT OF ME AS OF THE PRESENT TIME ACCORDING TO THE
18	CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, SEE, BECAUSE YOU ARE DEALING
19	ONLY ON WHAT IS BEING CONSIDERED AN ORDER OF THE STATE BAR
20	OF CALIFORNIA, WHICH ITSELF IS AN INVALID ORDER. AND IN
21	THEY ARE TRYING TO GO BY ANYTHING DONE BY THE CALIFORNIA
22	SUPREME COURT, THAT ORDER DOESN'T GO INTO EFFECT UNTIL, I

THE COURT: I DON'T THINK THIS IS THE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR ME TO ORDER THE CONTEMNOR TO DO OTHER THINGS BECAUSE THEN WHAT IF HE DOESN'T DO THOSE AND, YOU KNOW, THIS PROCEEDING --

MR. COMER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

BELIEVE IT'S MARCH 13TH.

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1	THE COURT: PROCEEDING HAS GOT TO HAVE A
2	TERMINATING POINT, AND I THINK THIS IS IT.
3	MR. COMER: THEN WE HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR.
4	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT IS THEN SIGNING THE
5	JUDGMENT THAT HAS BEEN PARTIALLY READ TO COUNSEL TODAY.
6	MR. FINE IS ORDERED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE SHERIFF.
7	(THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.)
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1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3	DEPARTMENT NO. 86 HON. DAVID P. YAFFE, JUDGE
4	
5	MARINA STRAND COLONY II,)
6	PETITIONER,)
7	VS.) NO. BS 109420
8	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,) REPORTER'S
9) CERTIFICATE RESPONDENT.)
10	<u> </u>
11	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)) SS
12	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
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15	I, CYNTHIA S. CRUZ, OFFICIAL REPORTER OF THE SUPERIOR
16	COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS
1.7	ANGELES, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING PAGES, 1
18	THROUGH 26, COMPRISE A FULL, TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF
19	THE PROCEEDINGS HELD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON MARCH 4,
20	2009.
21	
22	
23	DATED THIS 31 ST DAY OF MARCH, 2009.
24	
25	applied free_, csr #9095
26	OFFICIAL REPORTER